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Law

Triangle:
Arbitrating
International Reinsurance Disputes
Under the New York Convention,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and
Antagonistic State Law
ABSTRACT

The McCarran-FergusonAct was enacted to preserve the
longstandingprerogative of the States to regulate the insurance
industry. States have acted in accordance with this statute to
declare arbitrationagreements in insurance contracts invalid.
However, the Senate has since ratified the New York Convention
and appended implementing legislation to the Federal
Arbitration Act that obligates domestic courts to recognize
arbitrationagreements in all internationalcontracts. In an odd
convergence of authority, a functional conflict arises between
these three bodies of law: the federal law says that state law
controls in this area, even over other federal law that might
incidentally cover the subject of insurance; the reversepreemptive state law instructs that arbitrationagreements are
void in all circumstances; and a later-in-date treaty and
corresponding implementing legislation purportedly compel
enforcement of the agreement. A resolution of this conflict is
required.
In a recent case in the district court for the Northern
District of Georgia, a British insurer attempted to enforce an
arbitration agreement contained within a reinsurance
agreement with a Georgia-based investment company. The
reinsurer resisted, invoking the McCarran-FergusonAct and
arguing that Georgia law quite clearly states that arbitration
agreements in insurance contractsare void as a matter of public
policy.
The court held that even though the arbitration
agreement would be invalid in a domestic setting, special
considerations pertaining to
international commercial
arrangementscounseled that this arbitrationagreement should
be enforced.
This Note argues that the outcome in Goshawk was the
correct one, but expands the doctrinal basis on which courts
should rely when faced with this conflict. Courts should invoke
any of four doctrines to enforce arbitration agreements in
1535
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international reinsurance contracts: (1) pacta sunt servanda
and the corresponding obligation to abide by the text of a
ratified treaty; (2) the Charming Betsy canon's teaching that
domestic law should not be interpreted in a manner that
conflicts with internationallaw and obligations; (3) the last-intime rule, which gives the force of law to the latest expression of
the state's will in a certain area; and (4) the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence enforcing internationalarbitrationagreements in
a host of situations based on notions of international
commercial comity, cooperation,and efficiency.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The aim of Congress was clear when it enacted the McCarranFerguson Act 1 in 1945: "The business of insurance.., shall be subject
to the laws of the several States. '2 This provision arose from a
surprising coup by the Supreme Court that usurped the long-standing
prerogative of the States to regulate the insurance industry. 3 By
generally exempting the "business of insurance" from federal
regulation, Congress intended to repudiate the Court's decision and
return regulatory control over the insurance business to state
capitols. 4 Despite the overarching federalist nature of the McCarranFerguson Act, 5 Congress deliberately retained the power to regulate
the "business of insurance" through legislation that "specifically
relates to the business of insurance. '6 In other words, federal
oversight was to have effect only if specifically enacted to regulate the
business of insurance. Ancillary legislation could not indirectly
influence the manner in which the States oversaw the business of
7
insurance.

1.
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006)).
2.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2006).
3.
Compare Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868) (holding that the
issuance of insurance policies is not a transaction in interstate commerce, and, thus,
not subject to federal regulation), with United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322
U.S. 533 (1944) (holding that the insurance business is subject to federal regulation
under the Commerce Clause).
4.
See Edwin L. Smith, McCarran-Ferguson:A Perspective of Current Trends
and Issues, 14 FORUM 1032, 1032 (1979) ("The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in
1945 in response to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n."); Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust
Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 598
("[T]he McCarran Act was passed in reaction to [the South-Eastern Underwriters]
litigation."); id. (noting that one of the insurance industry's great successes in passing
the McCarran-Ferguson Act was "the preservation of state insurance commissioners'
powers of regulation and taxation").
5.
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-FergusonAct
of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role of Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13,
20 (1993) ('The McCarran-Ferguson Act is unusual-perhaps unique-in the
extraordinary deference it displays towards state regulation."); Weller, supra note 4, at
598 ("[T]he primary purpose of the McCarran Act was federalist.., in nature.").
6.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(h) (2006).
7.
See H.R. REP. NO. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
670, 672 (stating that one of the purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is that "no
act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any State law
which regulates . . . the insurance business, unless such act specifically so provides.")
(emphasis added).
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In its own path of development, arbitration has emerged as a
preferred method of resolving disputes the world over. 8 Defined as "a
device whereby the settlement of a question ...is entrusted to... the
arbitrator... who
derive[s]
their
powers
from
a private
agreement... and who ...decide[s] the case on the basis of such an
agreement,"9 arbitration is now the "accepted method for resolving
transnational commercial disputes."'1 However, arbitration has not
always enjoyed such prominence. Many judicial and legislative
bodies have historically been averse to arbitration. 1 This suspicion
migrated into American courts on the coattails of British common
law. 12
The U.S. Judiciary's distaste for arbitration and, the
enforcement of "future dispute" clauses was regularly on display until
the latter half of the twentieth century. 13 Nonetheless, jurists'
thoughts on alternative dispute resolution have progressed since the
time of judicial acrimony, and legislation at both the state and federal
levels now evinces an attitude of acceptance, if not encouragement,
toward the recognition of arbitration as a valid mechanism for
14
dispute resolution.
5
The "drive"' toward the apotheosis of arbitration as a method of
dispute resolution began with the enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925.16 Section 3 of the FAA mandates that
all federal courts stay any trial or proceeding and refer the dispute to

8.
See SIMON ROBERTS & MICHAEL PALMER, DISPUTE PROCESSES: ADR AND
THE PRIMARY FORMS OF DECISION-MAKING 264, 269 (2005).
9.
OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1-2 (1994) (quoting R. DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5
(1985)).
10.
ROBERTS & PALMER, supra note 8, at 270 (quoting Y. DEZALAY & B. GARTH,
DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 311 (1996)); see also Andrew T.
Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE
L.J. 1279, 1281 (2000) ("The use of arbitration to resolve international business
disputes has become commonplace. Indeed, most international contracts now contain
an arbitration clause, making arbitration ... the most common form of dispute
resolution for these transactions.")
11.
Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE
L.J. 1049, 1049 (1961). For a discussion of the evolution of arbitration, see generally
Robert B. von Mehren, From Vynior's Case to Mitsubishi: The Future of Arbitration
and Public Law, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 583, 583-93 (1986).
12.
Quigley, supra note 11, at 1049.
13.
See id. (commenting that in 1961, "this hostility remain[ed] the judicial
attitude of most of the states").
14.
For a comprehensive listing of relevant state statutes, see Quigley, supra
note 11, at 1050 n.5.
15.
Quigley, supra note 11, at 1050.
16.
United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006)). Though the original legislation titled the Act the "United
States Arbitration Act," it is commonly referred to as the "Federal Arbitration Act."
See Quigley, supra note 11, at 1050.
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arbitration when presented with a valid arbitration agreement
regarding that issue. 17 The FAA's purpose "was to reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts. '18 Moreover, the original text of the legislation
indicated a specific congressional intent to enforce arbitration
agreements in contracts arising out of interstate and international
19
commerce.

The ascent of arbitration was not unique to the United States.
Recognizing the trend toward the use of extra-judicial proceedings for
the settlement of disputes, countries around the world solidified their
commitment to international arbitration as an efficient means of
dispute resolution. 20
The Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the Convention) 21 in 1958
was a bellwether for the acceptance of international dispute
resolution. The New York Convention, as it is commonly referenced,

17.

§ 3, 43 Stat. at 883. The full text of the section reads:

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.

Id.
18.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see also
William B. Gould IV,Kissing Cousins?: The Federal ArbitrationAct and Modern Labor
Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 610 (2006) (noting that the Federal Arbitration Act
was "focused ...upon commercial agreements and arrangements and designed to both
confront and diminish judicial hostility toward arbitration").
19.
See pmbl., 43 Stat. at 883 ("An Act to make valid and enforceable written
provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of ...commerce among
the States or Territories or with foreign nations.").
20.
See, e.g., Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts [Arbitral
Proceedings Reform Act], Dec. 22, 1997, BGB1. I at 3224, art. 1, no. 7, § 1032(1)
(F.R.G.), translation available at http://www.dis-arb.de/materialien/schiedsverfahrens
recht98-e.html ("A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the
subject of an arbitration agreement shall .. .reject the action as inadmissible unless
the court finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable
of being performed."); see also von Mehren, supra note 11, at 593 ("Arbitration has
become a welcome method of resolving disputes in almost all the legal systems of the
world.").
21.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter Convention].
As of October 2008, 142 countries had ratified the Convention. Status-1958
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 27. 2008) [hereinafter Status].
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represented international recognition of the importance of arbitration
to international commercial comity and codified a necessary
framework for consistent dispute resolution for international
agreements.
The Convention was a logical extension of U.S.
arbitration policy, and, after overcoming its initial reticence, the
United States affirmed its commitment toward international
commercial arbitration by ratifying the Convention in 1970.22 Soon
after, implementing legislation brought the provisions of the
23
Convention into the full force of law.
Today, insurance disputes are increasingly resolved through the
use of binding arbitration. 24 Arbitration is generally recognized as
providing significant advantages over traditional litigation, including
privacy, finality, cost reduction, and speed. 25 Parties are able to
preserve the privacy of their circumstances through the use of a
private adjudicator and forum-whereas courts rarely deny public
access to proceedings. 26 Most arbitration decisions are final, and the

22.
See H.R. REP. No. 91-1181, at 1 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3601, 3601.
23.
See Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-208 (2006)).
24.
See Robert M. Magino & Anne M. Flynn, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A
Reinsurance Perspective, in RESOLVING REINSURANCE DISPUTES: CONTRACTS,
ARBITRATION, LITIGATION 73, 76 (Tort & Insur. Practice Sec., Am. Bar Ass'n ed., 1989)
('Voluntary, ad hoc arbitration is the type [of alternative dispute resolution] most
commonly utilized by reinsurers .... "); Vincent J. Vitkowsky, Whither Reinsurance?:A
Guide to InternationalReinsurance Litigation, in RESOLVING REINSURANCE DISPUTES:
CONTRACTS, ARBITRATION, LITIGATION, supra, at 147, 150-51 ("[M]ost reinsurance
disputes have been, and continue to be, arbitrated.").
25.
ROBERTS & PALMER, supra note 8, at 268; see Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante
Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly-Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
335, 340 (2007) ("Notwithstanding these skeptical views [about the advantages of
arbitration], the bulk of authority seems to agree that arbitration is a more efficient
dispute resolution process than litigation."). It should be noted that whether
arbitration actually provides these advantages is the subject of great debate, but not an
issue for discussion in this Note. See, e.g., ROBERTS & PALMER, supra note 8, at 268
("[Iun well-developed systems of arbitration this ideology may have little to do with
reality. Costs can escalate quickly ....
A 'queue' may well develop."); John Nonna,
Reinsurance Arbitration: Boon or Bust?, in RESOLVING REINSURANCE DISPUTES:
CONTRACTS, ARBITRATION, LITIGATION, supra note 24, at 177, 179-80 (noting that
critics recognize certain downfalls of arbitration: "lengthy delays in selection . . .; a
tendency by arbitrators to compromise rather than reach a reasoned decision based
upon legal principles . . .; satellite legislation . . .; and the lack of opportunity for
discovery"). For an extensive overview of the relative advantages and disadvantages of
arbitration as compared to public courts and citation to voluminous literature on the
subject, see Eisenberg & Miller, supra, at 336-41.
26.
ROBERTS & PALMER, supra note 8, at 268. See generally MARTIN DOMKE,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 10-11 (1965); George T. Yates III, Arbitration or Court
Litigation for Private International Dispute Resolution: The Lesser of Two Evils, in
RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 224,
231-32 (1984).
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27
majority of arbitration agreements do not provide for an appeal.
Cost reduction is achieved through simplified proceduresparticularly those where representation by attorneys is not
necessary. 28 Finally, the parties to arbitration do not have to be
worked into a court's busy docket; they may proceed to arbitration
29
whenever they are ready.
Despite the perceived benefits of arbitration, many states have
seen fit to curtail its use in various contexts because of public policy
concerns.30 Such was the decision of Georgia when it exempted "[a]ny
contract of insurance" from a general statutory mandate to enforce
valid arbitration agreements. 3 1 The implication of this provision was
recently contested in the federal district court for the Northern
District of Georgia when a party invoked the Georgia statute to
preclude the court from issuing an order compelling arbitration in
32
Goshawk Dedicated Lmtd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. f
Goshawk, a British insurer, brought suit seeking an order compelling
arbitration pursuant to a provision in its reinsurance contract with
Portsmouth, a Georgia-based investment company.3 3
Goshawk
contended that the Convention and its implementing legislation
"control the parties' agreement and require [the] enforcement [of the
arbitration agreement].""
Portsmouth responded that any
arbitration agreement was unenforceable because, under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, Georgia Code § 9-9-2(c)(3) reverse-preempts
any federal legislation which incidentally regulates the business of
insurance, including the Convention, its implementing legislation,
35
and the Federal Arbitration Act.
The district court found for Goshawk and held that the
Convention controlled pursuant to the "policies recognized in the

27.
ROBERTS & PALMER, supra note 8, at 268.
28.
Id. See generally DOMKE, supra note 26, at 9; Yates, supra note 26, at 224,
226-28, 226 n.7.
29.
ROBERTS & PALMER, supra note 8, at 268. See generally DOMKE, supra note
26, at 8; Yates, supra note 26, at 228-29.
30.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (West 2007) (stating that GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-9-3, which codifies the enforceability of any agreement to arbitrate, does not
apply to "[a]ny contract of insurance"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-010(6) (West
2007) ("If there is a delinquency proceeding under this subtitle, the provisions of this
subtitle shall govern those proceedings, and all conflicting contractual provisions
contained in any contract . . . shall be deemed subordinated to the provisions of this
subtitle.").
31.
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(3). Georgia defines insurance as "a contract which
is an integral part of a plan for distributing individual losses whereby one undertakes
to indemnify another or to pay a specified amount or benefits upon determinable
contingencies." GA. CODE ANN. § 33-1-2(2) (West 2007).
32.
466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
33.
Id. at 1296.
34.
Id. at 1301; see 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-208 (2006).
35.
Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. 1, 466 F. Supp. 2d
1293, 1301 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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context of international commerce that strongly favor enforcement of
arbitration clauses.13 6 In so concluding, the court specifically rejected
a prior decision of the Second Circuit, which held that the Convention
was not self-executing, and, therefore, did not preempt a similar antiarbitration statute in Kentucky.3 7 Thus, reasoned the Second Circuit,
the implementing legislation of the Convention-as a part of the
Federal Arbitration Act-was reverse-preempted pursuant to the
38
McCarran-Ferguson Act.

The Northern District of Georgia reached these results even
though it was clear at the time that "despite the [Federal Arbitration
Act's] strong policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, arbitration clauses in insurance contracts-at least in
the domestic context-are generally unenforceable in Georgia.13 9
Both the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme
Court of Georgia concluded that the Georgia anti-arbitration statute
was aimed at the "relationship between insurer and insured," 40 and
thus reverse-preemptive of federal law because "[s]tatutes aimed at
protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or indirectly are
' 41
laws regulating the 'business of insurance.'
Despite the generally preemptive effect given to Section 9-9-2 by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit
and Supreme Court of Georgia, the Goshawk opinion focused on two
reasons why the Convention should nonetheless control. As a
precursor, the court rejected the postulate that the Convention should
apply because the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not intended to apply
to international arbitration agreements. 42 The court then held, first,
that "[t]he Convention [s]upersedes the McCarran-Ferguson Act" and,
second, that the Convention applies to the agreement because
Portsmouth's "state law defense [of the anti-arbitration clause falls]

36.
Id. at 1306.
37.
See Stephens v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995).
38.
See id.
39.
Goshawk, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1302; see McKnight v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.,
Inc., 358 F.3d 854, 858-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the Federal Arbitration
Act does not preempt Georgia's anti-arbitration statute due to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act); Love v. Money Tree, Inc., 614 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. 2005) (holding that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act "prohibits the [Federal Arbitration Act] from preempting"
Georgia's anti-arbitration statute).
40.
SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969); see McKnight, 358 F.3d at
858; Love, 614 S.E.2d at 479-80.
41.
Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. at 460.
42.
Goshawk, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1302-03; see In re Arbitration Between West
of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass'n (Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., Nos. 91-3645,
91-3798, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992) ("The McCarran-Ferguson
Act does not apply to contracts made under the Convention, as it was intended to apply
only to interstate commerce, not to foreign commerce.").
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outside the scope of the affirmative defenses allowed under the
'43
Convention.
This Note will focus only on the former conclusion: that the
Convention does indeed "supersede[ ]"the McCarran-Ferguson Act
and applies due to the "strong international policy it expresses in
The
favor of enforcing commercial arbitration agreements. '44
discussion of affirmative defenses allowed under the Convention and
their application in U.S. courts is a worthwhile topic, but this Note
leaves it open for further debate at another time.
This Note analyzes the friction between a unique federal statute,
a widely accepted international treaty, and aggressive state
legislation and determines whether the outcome in Goshawk was the
correct one; namely, whether the Convention should be given
deference over state anti-arbitration statutes notwithstanding the
federalist mandate of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Part II presents a
complete discussion of the pertinent legislation, including the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Convention, and the legislation
implementing the Convention.
Part III briefly discusses the
necessary assumption that the arbitration of a reinsurance contract
of. the sort addressed in Goshawk constitutes the business of
insurance as envisioned in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Part IV
presents the issue in the context of three traditional doctrines
concerned with international law: pacta sunt servanda,45 the
Charming Betsy canon, 46 and the last-in-time rule. 4 7 Despite the
voluminous commentary regarding each of these doctrines, this Note
will succinctly review their basic application in federal courts and,
accordingly, present the manner in which they should be applied in
the context of a conflict between purportedly reverse-preemptive state
statutes and the Convention. Part V assumes that none of these
traditional doctrines are available for use and constructs a rubric by
which courts can enforce agreements to arbitrate in international
reinsurance contracts based solely upon the jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court concerning international commercial arbitration.
This Part will also examine the Court's use of international policy
and comity to justify the enforcement of these agreements
notwithstanding the general proscription against their enforcement
in a domestic context. Finally, Part VI concludes the discussion.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Goshawk, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1311.
Id. at 1303 n.8.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part TV.B.
See infra Part JV.C.
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THE ACT, THE CONVENTION, AND IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION

A. The McCarran-FergusonAct
In Paul v. Virginia,48 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state
scheme regulating foreign insurers and declared that "[i]ssuing a
policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce," thereby
obviating any claim that regulation of the insurance industry was the
exclusive domain of the federal government. 49 For seventy-five years,
Paul was cited for the proposition that regulation of the business of
insurance was to be left to the states. 50 Indeed, state regulation of
the insurance industry was the norm during that span. Later
Supreme Court decisions confirmed Paul and the general practice of
local regulation. 51 It was widely acknowledged during this interval
that the federal government "had no authority over the insurance
'5 2
industry under the commerce clause.
Paul's pronouncement was the prevailing standard until the
Court decided U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association
(S.E.U.A.) in 1944. 53 In an opinion that "shocked the industry," 54 the
Court held both that the insurance industry was subject to federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause, and that the Sherman Act
applied to insurance transactions because they were "commerce" as
contemplated in Article I of the Constitution. 55 The decision sparked
an uproar that resounded through both Congress and state insurance
departments. "The decision precipitated widespread controversy and
dismay. Chaos was freely predicted. '56 There existed a real fear of a

48.
75 U.S. 168 (1868).
49.
Id. at 183; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have the
power . . . [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states....").
50.
See Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State
Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-FergusonAct in Historical Perspective, 56
MICH. L. REV. 545, 553 (1958) ("From 1868 to 1944 it was generally assumed that
insurance was not commerce, and was not subject to federal regulation."); Peter B.
Steffen, Note, After Fabe: Applying the Pireno Definition of "Business of Insurance"in
First-ClauseMcCarran-FergusonAct Clauses, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 447, 447 ("[T]he
Paul Court likened issuing an insurance policy to agreeing to a personal contract,
describing both as distinctly local transactions.").
51.
Joseph B. Beach, The South-Eastern Underwriters' Decision and Its Effect,
1947 Wis. L. REV. 321, 321; see N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495,
502 (1913).
52.
Weller, supra note 4, at 589.
53.
See United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
54.
Linda M. Lent, McCarran-Fergusonin Perspective, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 411,
411 (1981).
55.
S.E. UnderwritersAss'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-56 (1944); see Beach, supra note
51, at 322 ('The decision is very clear on the point that insurance is commerce and,
insofar as transactions which cross state lines are concerned, interstate commerce.").
56.
Weller, supra note 4, at 590 (quoting NEW YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT
REPORT 71 (1969)).
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federal takeover of the (previously assumed) state prerogative to
regulate the insurance industry. 5 7 This concern, however, was not
the only problem created by the S.E.U.A. decision.
Insurance
companies around the country refused to pay state-mandated taxes,
or paid them under protest, because of the concern that the Court
would soon find all state insurance regulation schemes to be
Driven by the prospect of a brusque and
unconstitutional. 58
precipitous change in the landscape of insurance regulation and
facing mutiny by insurance companies across the country, Congress
acted quickly to devise a solution that would restore a long-standing
core competency to the States. The response evolved into the
59
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act represented Congress' swift
reaction to the Court's usurpation of States' rights. 60 Congress,
anticipating the judicial about-face from the Court, had begun
considering a legislative rejoinder even before the Court handed down
the S.E. U.A. decision.6 1 From the outset, the impetus behind the
majority of proposals was the exemption of state insurance regulation
from all federal interference, including federal antitrust laws. 62 In
1943, Congress began to hold hearings on various schemes that
"would have provided a complete exemption for the insurance
' 63
industry from the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
A decisive attitude prevailed in the House, resulting in the
passage of the Walter-Hancock Bill in 1944.64 The Bill was widely
perceived as a much-needed suture for a deep gash in the corpus of
states' rights. 65 However, the Senate decided that this remedy was

57.
Id. at 591.
58.
Richard C. Reier, Case Note, Debate on State Versus Federal Regulation of
Insurance Continues: American General Insurance Co. v. FTC, 359 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.
Tex. 1973), 53 NEB. L. REV. 289, 291 (1974) (citing 91 CONG. REC. 1087 (1945) (remarks
of Rep. Hancock)).
59.
See Beach, supra note 51, at 323.
60.
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006)).
61.
See Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State
Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-FergusonAct in Historical Perspective, 56
MICH. L. REV. 545, 554 (1958) ("Pending decision of [S.E.U.A.], there were unsuccessful
attempts to exempt insurance from all federal regulation ....
").
62.
Specifically mentioned as legislative acts offensive to the purpose of
exempting state insurance regulators from federal interference were The Sherman
Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006)), The Clayton
Antitrust Act of 1915, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29, 52-53
(2006)), and The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (2006)). Kimball & Boyce, supra note 61, at 555.
63.
Weller, supra note 4, at 592.
64.
Id.; see H.R. 3270, 78th Cong. (1944).
65.
See H.R. REP. NO. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
670, 671 ("Your committee believes there is urgent need for an immediate expression of
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not what the doctor ordered for this Bill, much to the dismay of all
who had hoped for a complete abeyance of federal regulation from the
field of insurance-it was quickly rejected by the Senate. 66 The
rejection ended the hope of a full exemption bill, and subsequent
efforts to enact such legislation failed.6 7 Despite their eventual
downfall, these efforts reflect the true visage of insurance regulation
reform at the time. Recognizing the impact of the Walter-Hancock
Bill and other like-minded reforms is important for understanding
the congressional backdrop and intent when a viable solution was
ultimately devised and passed.
The proposal that eventually became the McCarran-Ferguson
Act originated from the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. 68 Known as the Commissioner's Bill, its essential
principles and language were eventually adopted as the McCarranFerguson Act.69
The commissioners declared that they were
particularly interested in "preserving state regulation of insurance,
not in eliminating the applicability of federal antitrust laws. '70 The
influence of the state insurance commissioners can be seen
throughout the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
McCarran-Ferguson was promulgated to "restore the supremacy
of the States in the realm of insurance regulation. '71 The House
Committee on the Judiciary stated that the purpose of the Act was to
"declare that the continued regulation ...by the several States of the
business of insurance is in the public interest. ' 72 The only direct
federal control to be retained by Congress was the prohibition against
73
antitrust measures inherent in the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
However, even those provisions were suspended for a short time to
74
allow for state antitrust regulation of insurance entities.

policy by the Congress with respect to the continued regulation of the business of
insurance by the respective States.") (emphasis added).
66.
Weller, supranote 4, at 592 (citing 90 CONG. REC. 8054 (1944)).
67.
See id. at 592.
68.
Id. at 593.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.; see Interim Report of the Subcommittee on Federal Legislation of the
Executive Committee of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1945
NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS PROC. 156, 159-60 ("The decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the South-Eastern Underwriters case confronted Congress, the State
Legislatures and the Insurance Commissioners with a problem-the task of preserving
state regulation and at the same time not emasculating the federal anti-trust laws.").
71.
U.S. Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500 (1993).
72.
H.R. REP. NO. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 670,
672.
73.
See id. at 672 ("It should be noted that this bill ... does not repeal the
Sherman and Clayton Acts.").
74.
Id. at 672 ("The purpose of the bill is . . . to assure a more adequate
regulation of this business in the States by suspending the application of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts for approximately two sessions of the States legislatures ....
").
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Given its purpose, and the goal of this Note, one specific
provision of the Act merits special scrutiny:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance.

75

Though the intended scope of this provision has sparked much
disagreement, the Supreme Court has dictated some guidelines. The
Court has been clear that, however expansive the section may seem
on its face, it does "not seek to insulate state insurance regulation
from the reach of all federal law. ' 76 Instead, its primary function is to
"protect state regulation ...against inadvertent federal intrusionsay, through enactment of a federal statute that describes an affected
activity in broad, general terms, of which the insurance business
happens to constitute one part."77 While the Act quite clearly applies
to instances where the federal government has unintentionally
trodden onto state grounds, its application to international commerce
is far from settled. 78 This is particularly true where the United
States has ratified a treaty that possibly impinges on the parameters
of state law, such as the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
B. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
ForeignArbitral Awards
A resurgence of international commerce following World War II
and the insufficiency of pre-war multilateral agreements 79 led the

75.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
76.
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 39 (1996)
(emphasis added).
77.
Id.
78.
Compare In re Arbitration Between West of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Ins.
Ass'n (Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., Nos. 91-3645, 91-3798, 1992 WL 37700, at
*4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992) ('The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply to contracts
made under the Convention, as it was intended to apply only to interstate commerce,
not to foreign commerce."), with Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co.
I, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (rejecting the reasoning of England Ship
Owners).
79.
Both the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27
L.N.T.S. 157, and the 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302, were concluded on an international scale and
were in effect at the time of the New York Conference which resulted in the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The United States,
however, was not a party to either instrument. Gerald Aksen, American Arbitration
Accession Arrive in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U. L.
REV. 1,4 (1971).
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International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to ask the United Nations
to explore the possibility of a convention concerned with the
enforcement of arbitral awards.8 0 The UN obliged the request, and
the Economic and Social Council convened an ad hoc committee to
review the draft convention submitted by the ICC in 1954.81
Comments by the committee, member states, and non-governmental
organizations led to a decision to convene a conference to draft a final
convention.8 2 The original purpose of the conference in New York
was to consider only the recognition and enforcement of awards
conferred in arbitrations.8 3 However, the conference decided "to
consider, if time permits, other possible measures for increasing the
effectiveness of arbitration in the settlement of private law
disputes."8 4 One of those "other possible measures" was to strengthen
the ability of states to enforce arbitration agreements contained in
international agreements.
The inclusion of a provision regarding the enforcement of
arbitration agreements-as compared to the recognition of arbitral
awards-was a contentious decision at the New York Conference.
The original proposal by Sweden for such a provision in the draft
convention was rejected.8 5 The intention of the conference was 8to6
leave such matters for an additional protocol to the final convention.
However, the proposal was reintroduced and gained majority support
on the reasoning that "the purpose of the Convention would be
defeated if a court, petitioned to enforce an arbitral award under the
Convention, was permitted to refuse to recognize the validity of the
87
arbitration agreement on which the award was based.
Commentators at the time recognized that the inclusion of provisions
with the purpose of enforcing arbitration clauses in contracts
governed by the Convention was of the utmost importance.8 8 The

80.
Quigley, supra note 11, at 1059; see also Martin Domke, Note, The United
Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 414,
414 (1959).

81.
Id.
82.
Domke, supra note 80, at 414.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Paolo Contini, International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. J.
COMP. L. 283, 296 (1959).
86.

ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF

1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 56 (1981).
87.
Id. (citing United Nations Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration, May 20-June 10, 1958, Consideration of the Draft Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwards: Sweden, Amendments to the
Draft Convention, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.8 (May 22, 1958)).
88.
James van R. Springer, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of ForeignArbitral Awards, 3 INT'L LAW. 320, 322 (1968).
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eventual assimilation of this provision into the final Convention
affirmed that Contracting States are indeed bound to recognize an
arbitration agreement that falls within the parameters of the
89
Convention in addition to any award conferred by the arbitral body.
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards was signed by twenty-four states by the end of
1958.90 Though a party to the New York negotiations, the United
States took "little and grudging part" in the conception and
formulation of the instrument. 91 In fact, the members of the U.S.
delegation to the United Nations recommended against signing the
Convention. 9 2
They posited four main reasons for this
recommendation:

The title Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards is actually a misnomer, since the Convention covers not only the
enforcement of arbitral awards but also the very important matter of giving
effect to agreements to arbitrate existing and future disputes. To some extent,
the latter aspect of the Convention was an afterthought, a fact that shows up in
the problems ... about the scope and meaning of the provisions on agreements
to arbitrate.

Id.
89.
Id. Albert Jan van den Berg notes that the definition of which arbitration
agreements actually fall under the auspices of the Convention is somewhat obtuse. VAN
DEN BERG, supra note 86, at 56. Article II of the Convention directs the courts of
Contracting States to the Convention to refer parties to arbitration when presented
with a valid arbitration agreement "in writing" between any two parties. Convention,
supra note 21, art. II. It seems apparent that any arbitration agreement providing for
arbitration in another state than the one in which the court is sitting falls under the
Convention. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 86, at 57. As for agreements providing for
arbitration in the same state as the one in which the court sits, or those where the
place of arbitration is not specified, van den Berg suggests that the enforceability of the
agreement depend on the internationality of the parties to the agreement and the
subject matter of the dispute. Id. at 63-69. The United States, however, has one of the
most liberal interpretations of agreements which fall under the Convention. Id. at 69.
The implementing legislation of the Convention codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.,
indicates that even an arbitration agreement between two American parties will fall
under the Convention "if it involves a legal relationship which has a relation with one
or more foreign States." VAN DEN BERG, supra note 86, at 69.
For the purposes of this Note, we will assume, and properly so, that the Goshawk
arbitration agreement properly fell within the framework of the Convention and, thus,
was susceptible to enforcement by an American court.
90.
Status, supra note 21. Belgium, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Germany, India,
Israel, Jordan, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Poland signed the Convention on
June 10, 1958, the day it was opened for signature. Id. The remaining states which
signed the Convention by the end of the year were Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria,
Ecuador, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Monaco, Pakistan, the Russian Federation
(then the United Soviet Socialist Republic), Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, and
"Ukraine. Id.
91.
Hans Harnik, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 31
AM. J. COMP. L. 703, 703 (1983).
92.
Aksen, supra note 79, at 4. As unusual as this refusal to sign the document
may seem, Italy played a much more significant role in the drafting of the Convention,
yet its representatives also refused to sign the document at the close of the Convention.
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First, it was stated that if the Convention was accepted in a manner
that would avoid conflicting with state laws, it would offer no
meaningful advantages to the United States; second, if accepted in a
manner that assured such advantages it would override the arbitration
laws of a majority of the states; third, the United States lacked a
sufficient domestic legal basis for acceptance of an advanced
international convention dealing with this subject matter; and lastly,
the Convention embodied principles of arbitration law that would not
93
be desirable for the United States to endorse.

Though the Convention was signed on June 10, 1958, and took effect
94
on June 7, 1959, it was not originally ratified by the United States.
However, over the next ten years the United States recognized the
relative benefits of accession, and President Johnson sent the
Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent in the spring of
1968 after an outpouring of popular support. 95 According to the
House Report, the Convention was ratified despite initial trepidation
because it would "serve the best interests of Americans doing
business abroad by encouraging them to submit their commercial
disputes to impartial arbitration ...which can be enforced in both
U.S. and foreign courts."96 The benefits of the Convention were
recognized by not only the U.S. Senate, but also many nongovernmental entities. The ratification of the Convention had the
support of the American Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, the American Arbitration Association, the
the
Arbitration
Commission,
Commercial
Inter-American
International Chamber of Commerce, the Office and Professional
Employees International Union, the Department of State, the
Department of Justice, and the Bureau of the Budget. 97 At the time
of ratification, there was "no opposition" to the terms of the
98
Convention.
Article II of the Convention discusses the nature of agreements
to arbitrate and the related obligations of states party to the
Convention:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in

See Eugenio Minoli, L'Italie et la Convention de New York pour la Rdconnaissance et
l'exdcution des Sentences Arbitrales ,trang~res [Italy and the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards], in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION LIBER AMORICUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 199, 199 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1967).
93.
Aksen, supra note 79, at 4 (citing United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, May 20-June 10, 1958, Official Report of the
United States Delegation 22 (1958)); Quigley, supra note 11, at 1074 n.108.
94.
H.R. REP. No. 91-1181, at 1 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601,
3601.
95.
Id. at 2; Aksen, supra note 79, at 6.
96.
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 2.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.

20081

ARBITRATING INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE DISPUTES

1551

respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a
matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within
the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties,
refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement
99
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

It is evident from the language of the treaty that arbitration
agreements between "Contracting States" must be enforced unless a
court holds the agreement to be "null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed." 10 0 This clause indicates that the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement may be refused only if a
party can prove that the "arbitration agreement is contrary to the
public policy of the country in which it is sought to be enforced." 10 1
The Supreme Court of the United States has previously
addressed the purposes of the Convention and its role in arbitral
disputes:
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying
American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements

to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards
10 2
enforced in the signatory countries.

are

Though the Court in that instance refused to place exclusive reliance
on the Convention, or even determine whether the Convention in and
of itself would require enforcement of the arbitration agreement, the
Court nevertheless held that the Convention and its implementing
legislation were "strongly persuasive evidence" of a policy supporting
the enforcement of arbitral agreements-even in the face of contrary
10 3
domestic law.
C. The Implementing Legislation
When Congress implements a treaty that has garnered the
signature of the President and the advice and consent of the Senate
through legislation, it is the language of that implementing
legislation that controls the treaty's enforcement in domestic courts,

Convention, supranote 21, arts. 11(1), 11(3).
99.
Id. art. 11(3).
100.
Richard A. Cole, The Public Policy Exception to the New York Convention on
101.
the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RES. 365,
371 (1986).
102.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
Id.
103.
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not the original text of the instrument. 10 4 Absent implementing
legislation, treaties are enforceable in domestic courts only if they are
found to be "self-executing. '10 5 The self-executing determination,
however, is complicated and nuanced, and Congress will often bypass
any chance of doubt concerning the force of a treaty by enacting
10 6
implementing legislation.
In the case of the Convention, Congress enacted implementing
legislation in order to make the provisions of the Convention
enforceable in the courts of the United States. 10 7 The implementing
legislation placed the force of law behind the Convention by stating
that the Convention "shall be enforced in United States courts"
8
according to the provisions of the implementing legislation. 10
Because the Convention could not have been fully enforced to
effectuate its object and purpose without the implementing
legislation, exclusive reliance on the language of the Convention is
impermissible.10 9
Disputes are governed by the implementing
legislation insofar as it applies.
Importantly, the implementing legislation states that a court
"may direct that arbitration be held in accordance with" an
agreement falling under the Convention" l0 and that any award
conferred under such an agreement "shall [be] confirm[ed] unless [the
court] finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or
enforcement of the award specified in the Convention.""'
The
legislative instruction that domestic courts "may direct" arbitration
when there exists a valid arbitration agreement represents a slight

104.
This is due to the "last-in-time" rule discussed infra. See infra Part IV.C;
see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the [C]onstitution a treaty
is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation .... [T]he one last in date will control will control the other.").
105.
See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
371 (2006) ("Since early in U.S. history ....the Supreme Court has ... held that, in the
absence of implementing legislation, only self-executing treaties are judicially
enforceable.").
106.
CompareAsakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (holding to be selfexecuting a bilateral treaty between Japan and the U.S. which gave citizens of both
countries the ability "generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon
the same terms as native citizens" while within the borders of the foreign state), with
United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876-77 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding to be non-selfexecuting Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, a multilateral Convention to
which the U.S. was a party). Despite the difficulties of the determination of treaty of
self-execution, some trends do emerge: Bilateral treaties tend to be found to be selfexecuting more often than multilateral conventions, and provisions of a treaty affecting
or prescribing specific, individual rights tend to be found to be self-executing more
often than those providing for general obligations of the state-party.
107.
See Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-208 (2006)).
108.
9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
109.
Aksen, supra note 79, at 16.
110.
9 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).
111.
9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006).
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change from the original text of Article II(1) of the Convention, which
is mandatory in its instruction, rather than permissive.'1 2 The House
Report confirmed this distinction by indicating that "section 206 is
permissive rather than mandatory."" 3 Though the permissive nature
of the implementing legislation would seem at first glance to mirror
the "null and void" clause of the original Convention1 4-providing an
escape clause where domestic policy renders an arbitration
agreement unenforceable-the House Report indicated otherwise:
Section [206] permits a court to direct that arbitration be held at the
place provided for in the arbitration agreement. Since there may be
circumstances in which it would be highly desirable to direct
arbitration within the district in which the action is brought and
inappropriate to direct arbitration abroad, section 206 is permissive
115
rather than mandatory.

Therefore, Section 206 is not a duplicative acknowledgement of the
"null and void" clause; rather, it is simply an instruction to domestic
courts regarding venue and concerns inherent to the enforcement of
the language of the Convention.
Despite the permissive text of Section 206, purely international
arbitration agreements, such as the one in Goshawk, should be
consistently enforced. Foundational interpretive techniques counsel
against a permissive reading of the language of Section 206, except in
those situations explicitly set forth in the House Report. Congress
chose new language for Section 206 not to allow judges discretion in
enforcing international arbitration agreements, but to encourage the
arbitrability of transnational disputes. Thus, the language and
intent of both the Convention and the implementing legislation
suggest that purely international arbitration agreements must be
enforced by the courts of the United States.

III.

ARBITRATION OF A REINSURANCE CONTRACT AS THE
"BUSINESS OF INSURANCE"

For the reverse-preemptive effect of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
to take hold in a case similar to Goshawk, the arbitration of a

Article 11(1) of the Convention reads as follows: "Each Contracting State
112.
shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit
to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen .... Convention, supra note 21,
art. 11 (1) (emphasis added).
Letter from H.G. Torbert, Jr., Acting Assistant Sec'y for Cong. Relations,
113.
Dep't of State, to the Speaker, House of Representatives (Dec. 3, 1969) (requesting the
enactment of the implementing legislation for the Convention), attached to and made a
part of H.R.REP. No. 91-1181 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3604.
114.
See Convention, supra note 21, art. 11(3).
H.R. REP. No. 91-1181, at 2 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601,
115.
3603.
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reinsurance contract must first constitute the "business of
'116
insurance.
The Goshawk court assumed that the arbitration of the
reinsurance contract was indeed the business of insurance as
contemplated in the McCarran-Ferguson Act based upon two
previous decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 117 Nonetheless, the definition of
"business of insurance" is so central to the analysis of the
implications of the Act that it warrants a brief review.
The first interpretation of the phrase "business of insurance" by
any member of the U.S. Supreme Court occurred in Justice Douglas's
plurality opinion for the Court in Securities & Exchange Commission
v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of America.118 Justice Douglas
focused his inquiry on the essential element of insurance-namely,
the transfer of risk from the policyholder to the insurer. 119
Accordingly, he concluded that any contract or function of an
insurance company that was not involved in removing a significant
amount of risk from the policyholder or insured entity did not
120
constitute the business of insurance.
The first Supreme Court majority opinion addressing the
definition of business of insurance in a non-antitrust setting was
S.E.C. v. National Securities.121 There, the Court rejected the
contention that the reverse-preemption mechanism of the McCarranFerguson Act operates upon a state statute protecting the interests of
individuals owning stock in insurance companies. 122 Instead, the
Court concluded that statutes that regulate the business of insurance
are those focusing on "the relationship between the insurance
company and the policyholder."'1 23 This definition constituted a
significant narrowing of the existing definition of "business of

116.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006); Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 39 (1996).
117.
Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I, 466 F. Supp. 2d
1293, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (citing McKnight v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 854
(11th Cir. 2004); Love v. Money Tree, Inc., 614 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. 2005)).
118.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (SEC) v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359
U.S. 65, 71 (1959). A concurring opinion written by Justice Brennan, in which Justice
Stewart joined, was necessary for the decision of reversal. See id. at 73.
119.
Id. at 71 ("[W]e conclude that the concept of 'insurance' involves some
investment risk-taking on the part of the company. . . . We deal with a more
conventional concept of risk-bearing when we speak of 'insurance."').
120.
Robert P. Rothman, Note, The Definition of "Business of Insurance"under
the McCarran-FergusonAct after Royal Drug, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1480 (1980); see
S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. at 72-73 ("The companies that
issue these annuities take the risk of failure. But they guarantee nothing to the
annuitant except an interest in a portfolio of common stocks or other equities-an
interest that has a ceiling but no floor.").
121.
393 U.S. 453 (1969).
122.
Id. at 457.
123.
Id. at 460.
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insurance" as it was understood at the time of the National Securities
decision.124
The Supreme Court set out a new definition of the "business of
insurance" in non-antitrust settings 125 in U.S. Department of the
Treasury v. Fabe.126 The majority wrote that "[t]he broad category of
laws enacted 'for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance'
consists of laws that possess the 'end, intention, or aim' of adjusting,
managing, or controlling the business of insurance. ' 12 7 The definition
was intended for application only in a non-antitrust context. 128 The
Court had previously set forth a separate test for defining "business
of insurance" as it was intended in an antitrust setting in Union
Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno.129 Moreover, lower courts have
explicitly acknowledged the dichotomous definitions of the term and
that the correct definition depends upon whether it is used in an
130
antitrust or non-antitrust setting.
The Goshawk court was correct in concluding that state
regulation of arbitration agreements in reinsurance contracts is
uniquely concerned with the business of insurance. Laws regulating
the arbitration of insurance contracts surely fall within the category
of those laws possessing the "end, intention, or aim" of managing the
131
business of insurance.

124.
Steffen, supranote 50, at 454.
125.
The latest pronouncement of the Court's definition of the "business of
insurance" in the antitrust context was in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S.
119 (1982):
There are three criteria relevant in determining whether a particular practice
is part of the "business of insurance" exempted from the antitrust laws by § 2(b)
[of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)]: first, whether
the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk;
second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited
to entities within the insurance industry. None of these criteria is necessarily
determinative in itself
Id. at 120 (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979))
(emphasis added).
126.
U.S. Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993); Steffen, supra note 50,
at 463.
127.
Fabe, 508 U.S. at 505.
128.
Id. at 504 ("Both Royal Drug and Pireno ... involved the scope of the
antitrust immunity located in the second clause of § 2(b). We deal here with the first
clause, which is not so narrowly circumscribed.").
129.
Pireno,458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
130.
See Pireno v. N.Y. State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir.
1981) ("Royal Drug [an antitrust case] sets forth a substantially narrower scope for the
'business of insurance' exception than its approving citation of National Securities [a
non-antitrust case] might suggest."), aff'd sub nom Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno,
458 U.S. 119; Steffen, supra note 50, at 458 n.89 (same).
131.
Fabe, 508 U.S. at 505.
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IV. DOCTRINES REGARDING THE USE AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Once it has been determined that the state anti-arbitration
statutes regulate the business of insurance, the operative conflict
with which courts struggle arises. Under the standard operation of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the state anti-arbitration laws would
reverse-preempt any federal regulation incidental to the realm of
Theoretically, this would include the
insurance regulation.
Convention's implementing legislation. However, the Convention
provides an impediment to the normal operation of the preemption
A treaty on a specific topic occupies a peculiarly
mechanism.
supreme position within the hierarchy of controlling law. 132 Courts
must then decide between enforcing the Convention, which makes no
specific reference to insurance regulation, or deferring to the state
anti-arbitration statute. Additionally, even if the court decides that
the McCarran-Ferguson Act supersedes any state regulation due to
its status as the supreme law of the land, the plain language of the
implementing legislation still does not mandate the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. Recall that Section 206 states that courts
"may" order arbitration to be held upon finding a valid arbitration
agreement.13 3 Because the implementing legislation controls where a
treaty is not self-executing, it seems that judges have only the option
and
of enforcing the agreement-an outcome that raises doubt
134
uncertainty, neither of which benefits international commerce.
If the goal is to ensure the enforcement of the arbitration
agreement, two solutions may be found to the problem that this
conflict presents. First, under two canons of statutory construction
and a basic doctrine of international obligation, courts should
interpret the implementing legislation consistently with the
Convention in order to implement its object and purpose. The result
would be mandatory arbitration when the parties are bound by an
Under the pacta sunt
otherwise valid arbitration agreement.
servanda doctrine, the Charming Betsy canon, and the last-in-time
rule, courts are bound to enforce the implementing legislation of the
Convention over any contrary state law that might be preemptive
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 135 Moreover, they must enforce

132.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[AIll Treaties made, or which shall be made,
.
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .
9 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).
133.
134.
See Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonization of International
Commercial Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 647, 647-48 (1999)
("[W]hen public policy demands that certain kinds of contracts not be enforced, it is
important that parties know what these restrictions are in advance.").
135.
See infra Part IV.A-C.
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the implementing legislation in a manner that is consistent with the
original language of the Convention.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed jurisprudence
over the last fifty years that speaks specifically to this issue. The
Court has manifested its intent to raze any barriers to international
commerce, including courts' reluctance to implement valid arbitration
Resting on principles of international economic
agreements.
efficiency and comity, the Court has forcefully stated that relying
solely on domestic law for disputes in international commerce is
insufficient and impracticable. 136 Based on these precedents, the
Court has expressed a clear preference for interpreting the
implementing legislation and state laws in a manner that advances
international commercial cooperation. Each solution is examined in
137
turn.
A. Pacta Sunt Servanda
One of the most basic principles of international law is embodied
in the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.13 8 The doctrine is based on
the ancient ideal 139 of the sanctity of contract, and has been espoused
The
by Hobbes, 140 Aquinas, 14 1 von Martens 142 and others. 143
generally accepted terms of this doctrine are codified in Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT): 144 "Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith. '14 5 Moreover, a state "may not

136.
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts IV, V. The first solution is examined in the remainder of
137.
Part IV, and the second in Part V.
138.
See Josef L. Kunz, The Meaning and the Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt
Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 180, 180 (1945) ("The norm pacta sunt servanda, which
has constituted since times immemorial the axiom, postulate and categorical
imperative of the science of international law and has very rarely been denied on
principle, is undoubtedly a positive norm of generally international law.") (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
139.
The origins of the doctrine can be traced back to the cultural influences of
the Chaldeans, Egyptians and Chinese, and the basic religious doctrine of both Islam
and Christianity. See Hans Wehberg, PactaSunt Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775, 775
(1959).
140.
See id. at 778 (recalling that Hobbes recognized as a "natural law" the
obligation that agreements are to be kept unless the security of the state-raison
d'Ftat-so required).
141.
See id. at 176 (noting that Thomas Aquinas demanded on principle that
"contracts be performed even with regard to enemies").
142.
See id. at 779-80 ("[A] valid and binding contract creates, for nations and
individuals alike, the complete right to demand from the other party the performance
of the contract .... ").
143.
See generally id. at 776-82.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
144.
331 [hereinafter VCLT].
Id. art. 26.
145.

1558

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 41.1535

invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty."'146 As a corollary to that directive, states are
generally bound to interpret treaties "in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose." 147 Pacta sunt
servanda, and the corresponding respect accorded to obligations
arising under international conventions, is "perhaps the most
'148
important principle of international law.
The United States signed the VCLT less than one year after its
drafting; 149 however, as is well known, the United States has not yet
ratified the VCLT, though the convention has been awaiting the
Senate's advice and consent since 1972.150 Despite the Senate's nonacquiescence to the VCLT, the positive obligation of pacta sunt
servanda binds the United States as customary international law and
a general principle of international law recognized by nations
throughout the world. 15 1
Though its application in domestic courts sparks consternation
in commentators, 152 customary international law remains a rule of
decision for contests of an international nature. 53 Customary

146.
147.

Id. art. 27.
Id. art. 31.
148.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 321. cmt. a (1987).
149.
United Nations Treaty Collection, Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Status, http://treaties.un.org/PagesfViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=467&
chapter=23&lang=en (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
150.
Id.; see Richard M. Nixon, U.S. President, Letter of Transmittal of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to the United States Senate (Nov. 22, 1971),
reprinted in United States: Transmittal of Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties to
U.S. Senate, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 234, 234 (1972) [hereinafter Nixon's Letter of
Transmittal]. It is clear that signature of the concluding treaty document by the
plenipotentiaries of a State participating in the drafting of the treaty is not sufficient to
oblige the respective State under the terms of the treaty. Ratification is a "condition
sine qua non of the validity of treaties." Kunz, supranote 138, at 185.
151.
See generally Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 38(1)(b),
38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179 (listing "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted by law" and "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations," respectively, as sources of international law). The
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda is customary international law. Kunz, supra note 138,
at 180; Wehberg, supra note 139, at 782. Customary international law is binding upon
U.S. courts as a rule of substantive law. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
Therefore, pacta sunt servanda is a rule of decision for domestic courts, and binding
upon them.
152.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsrmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815, 817 (1997) ("This critique reveals that the modern position [that customary
international law is binding, substantive law] is founded on a variety of questionable
assumptions and that it is in tension with fundamental constitutional principles. We
conclude that, contrary to conventional wisdom, [customary international law] should
not have [supreme status].").
153.
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 105, at 485; see also The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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from acceptance by

common consent of civilized communities of rules designed to foster
amicable

and

workable

commercial

relations.

'154

Even

critics

recognize that courts have almost unanimously endorsed the idea of
155
customary international law as binding and substantive.
Therefore, as perhaps the most basic tenet of customary international
law, pacta sunt servanda deserve a corresponding degree of
deference.

156

Moreover, U.S. Executive Branch has already recognized the
customary international law implications of the doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda. In his Letter of Transmittal to the Senate accompanying
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, President Nixon

recognized that the VCLT represented the "codification of
international" and "treaty law. ' 15 7
The letter also specifically
mentioned the

doctrine of pacta sunt servanda and the VCLT's

"strong reaffirmartion of [that] basic principle."'158

Moreover, the
Secretary of State lauded the codification of "the long-standing
principle of customary international law that a party may not invoke

International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice . . as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination ....
[W]here there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to
the customs and usages of civilized nations ....
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
884-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that customary international law is enforceable as
federal common law); Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (1984).
"International law is part of our law." Justice Gray's much-quoted
pronouncement in The Paquete Habana was neither new nor controversial
when made in 1900, since he was merely restating what had been established
principle for the fathers of American jurisprudence and for their British legal
ancestors. And Gray's dictum remains unquestioned today.
Henkin, supra, at 1555 (internal citations omitted). Justice John Marshall spoke not of
"international law," but of "the law of nations" when making a similar statement as
Justice Gray. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815). The term "law of
nations" is probably analogous to Justice Grey's "international law," both of which
would encompass more than what is conceived as "international law" today, arguably
including customary international law. Henkin, supra, at 1555 n.1.
154.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1953).
155.
See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 152, at 817 ("[A]lmost every
federal court that has considered the modern position has endorsed it. Indeed, several
courts have referred to it as 'settled."').
156.
See Kunz, supra note 138, and accompanying text.
157.
Nixon's Letter of Transmittal, supra note 150, at 234.
158.
Id. (emphasis added).
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the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
159
perform a treaty."
Therefore, even though the United States has not yet ratified the
VCLT, the doctrines of pacta sunt servanda and faithful observation
of treaties represent customary international law binding upon the
United States. 160 Accordingly, under pacta sunt servanda, U.S.
courts must directly enforce the provisions of the Convention,
including those mandating the enforcement of arbitration agreements
that fall within the auspices of the Convention. This includes those
agreements contained in contracts between citizens of states who are
party to the Convention161-the United States and Great Britain
62
among them. 1
Domestic courts may refuse to enforce arbitration agreements
163
only upon a showing that the agreement would be "null and void"
or contrary to the public policy of the state of one of the parties to the
agreement. 164 This public policy exception has been interpreted
narrowly, 165 usually requiring the dissolution of an arbitration
agreement only where the agreement violates basic notions of
"morality and justice."'1 6 6 In Goshawk, the arbitration agreement did
not fall under either of the exceptions, and the court was, therefore,
bound to enforce the arbitration agreement faithfully and in
accordance with the terms of the Convention. Moreover, recall that

159.
William P. Rogers, U.S. Sec'y of State, Letter of Submittal of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to the President of the United States (Oct. 18,
1971), reprinted in United States: Transmittal of Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties to U.S. Senate, supra note 150, at 235.
160.
This Note does not purport to be comprehensive on the topic of pacta sunt
servanda or the obligations of the United States arising under customary international
law. Indeed, volumes have been prepared on the subject. What this Author has
intended is a cursory examination of the basic principle of customary international law
and its basic application. However, there are those that disagree with the
enforceability of customary international law. Moreover, the recognition by the United
States of the binding nature of treaty obligations has recently been questioned by the
International Court of Justice. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.)
2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31) (finding that the United States derogated its responsibilities
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations). See generally Houston A. Stokes,
Note, Broadening Executive Power in the Wake of Avena: An American Interpretationof
Pacta Sunt Servanda, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1219 (2006) (arguing that though U.S.
foreign policy supports the stance of Avena, unilateral executive withdrawal from the
optional protocol harms the foreign policy interests of the United States).
161.
See Convention, supra note 21, arts. 11(1), 11(3) ("The court of a Contracting
State ... shall ... refer the parties to arbitration .... ").
162.
Status, supra note 21 (stating that Great Britain acceded to the Convention
on Sept. 24, 1975).
163.
Convention, supra note 21, art. 11(3).
164.
Id. art. V(2)(b). See generally Cole, supra note 101.
165.
See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Soci6t6 Gin~rale de
L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that the
purposes of the Convention permitted only a "narrow reading of the public policy
defense").
166.
Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co. Ltd, 517 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1975).
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states cannot invoke provisions of internal law as justification for
failure to perform a treaty. 167 Therefore, domestic courts may not
invoke state law provisions that hinder the performance of the
Convention. State anti-arbitration statutes fall squarely into this
category. Under a strict interpretation of pacta sunt servanda, courts
may not ignore the obligations conferred by the Convention by relying
on conflicting state anti-arbitration laws.
Some may, however, see this conclusion as inconsistent with the
basic principle that implementing legislation controls over the
express language of a treaty. This is particularly evident in this case,
where adherence to pacta sunt servanda would require enforcement
of all valid arbitration agreements, but the implementing legislation
allows courts discretion in making that judgment. In a case such as
this, courts must, at the least, interpret the implementing legislation
and domestic law consistently with the intended object and purpose of
the Convention. 168 The travauxprdparatoiresreveal that the drafters
of the Convention believed that a provision requiring the enforcement
of arbitration agreements was of the utmost importance to the
successful operation of the treaty. 16 9 They understood that the
original object and purpose of the treaty-the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards--could be effectuated only if courts
enforced the agreements under which the awards would be
promulgated.
The Convention was thus concluded with a dual
purpose-to enforce both awards and agreements. 170 Domestic court
judgments must reflect this intent, and, therefore, must enforce valid
arbitration agreements that they are presented with. Indeed, the
Federal Arbitration Act to which the legislation implementing the
Convention was appended, states that courts must stay any judicial
proceeding "referable to arbitration" when presented with a valid
171
arbitration agreement in writing.
Despite the preeminence of pacta sunt servanda, some courts are
hesitant to rely squarely on the doctrine due to its sparse treatment
in the context of domestic law by the Supreme Court. As an
alternative, courts may base their obligation to enforce arbitral
agreements upon two rules of statutory construction devised by the
Court: the CharmingBetsy canon and the last-in-time rule.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See VCLT, supra note 144, art. 27.
Id. art. 31; supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.
Convention, supra note 21, arts. 1(1), H1(1).
9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
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The Charming Betsy Canon

The Supreme Court has always interpreted domestic statutes in
17 2

a manner such that they do not conflict with international law.
This canon of statutory construction has been memorialized as the

Charming Betsy canon. 173 It is so named from the first invocation of
the canon by Chief Justice Marshall in Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy. 174 There, the Court held that "an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.
canon
"has
been

' 17 5

Since its inception, the Charming Betsy
reaffirmed"
consistently,
often
without

reconsideration. 176 Along with the interpretation ascribed to the
Charming Betsy case, courts have typically extended the canon by
applying the general presumption that "statutes do not apply

172.
BRADLEY & GoIDSMITH, supra note 105, at 575; see Jordan J. Paust,
Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and International Law:
Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 383,
400 n.9 (1987) ("It was expected quite early that statutes should be interpreted so as to
be consistent with international law.").
173.
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 105, at 576.
174.
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). The case
arose out of the conflict with France at the turn of the 19th century. Congress had
passed the Non-Intercourse Act of 1800, which prohibited commerce between U.S. and
French citizens. Act of Feb. 27, 1800, 2 Stat. 7. Enforcement of the statute was vested
in the U.S. Navy, which was under orders to capture any ship suspected of trading with
France. The Charming Betsy had sailed from Baltimore under a U.S. flag and U.S.
captain to St. Thomas, where it was purchased by Mr. Shattuck. Shattuck was born in
the U.S., but had moved to St. Thomas, a Danish territory, when he was very young
and had thence become a Danish citizen. While captained by Shattuck, the Charming
Betsy was captured by the U.S. Navy under suspicion of trading with Guadaloupe, a
French dependency, in violation of the Non-Intercourse Act. Shattuck argued that the
seizure violated international law because he was a citizen of a neutral country. The
Court agreed, and construed the Act as not applying to Shattuck because he was not a
U.S. citizen-the result of a contrary construction being that the application of the Act
would have violated international laws of neutrality. See CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. at 6467. See generally BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 105, at 575-80.
175.
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118; see also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32
(1982). It should be noted that the Court set forth a similar proposition in its littleknown decision in Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). There, the Court, also
through the pen of Chief Justice Marshall, construed a statute such that it would not
violate customary international law. Id. at 43 ("[T]he laws of the United States ought
not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the common principles and
usages of nations."); id. at 44 ("By this construction the act of Congress will never
violate those principles which we believe, and which it is our duty to believe, the
legislature of the United States will always hold sacred.").
176.
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw as a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (1990); see, e.g., McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963); Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953). It is also worth noting that the principle, though
seemingly unanimously adopted by lower courts, is often subject to criticism and
"dismissed easily by some critics as innocuous or meaningless." Steinhardt, supra, at
1110 (footnotes omitted).
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extraterritorially, particularly where doing so might conflict with
international law. 177
The canon has been recognized as a method of interpretation of
178
substantive law, not just a jurisdictional limit on federal courts.
Moreover, the Court has reinterpreted the canon over time to
incorporate both customary international law and U.S. treaties
within the collection of substantive international law with which
federal statutes should not be construed to conflict. 179 Thus federal
law may not be construed incongruously with both the Convention
and the customary law obligation to effectuate its object and purpose.
The Charming Betsy canon encourages the enforcement of
international arbitration agreements in cases such as Goshawk for
three reasons. First, the canon instructs courts to interpret the
McCarran-Ferguson Act in such a manner that it does not violate
international law. Because treaties are binding codifications of
international law as conceived by the canon, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act must be interpreted in a manner that does not contravene the
Convention.
The simplest method of construction to achieve
consistency would be for courts to hold that international arbitration
agreements in insurance contracts do not constitute the business of
insurance; state statutes applied to these agreements would lack
preemptive effect under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 18 0
The
agreements would then be governed by federal law-namely, the
implementing legislation of the Convention-which would encourage
their enforcement.
However, because the Goshawk court, the
Eleventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court of Georgia have all
previously recognized that arbitration agreements are indeed
included within the business of insurance, an alternative solution is
181
required.
Urging courts to hold that the Convention and its implementing
legislation constitute federal legislation with a direct aim of

177.
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International
Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 302, 302 n.48 (2004)
("[S]tating that '[wlithout clearer evidence of congressional intent to do so than is
contained in the alien-exemption clause, we are unwilling to ascribe to that body a
policy which would raise difficult issues of international law."' (quoting EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991))).
178.
See Steinhardt, supra note 176, at 1161 ("[I]t operates to inform the
substantive interpretation of federal statutes.").
179.

Id. at 1160-61; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 114 (1986) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not
to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United
States.").
180.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2006) ("The business of insurance . . . shall be
subject to the laws of the several States .... "); 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006) ("No Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any
State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... .
181.
See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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regulating the business of insurance, not ancillary legislation with an
incidental impact on the field of insurance regulation, provides this
alternate solution. Under Section 1012(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, no federal legislation may supersede any state law concerning
insurance "unless such [legislation] specifically relates to the business
of insurance. '182 Construing the Convention and its implementing
legislation to fall within this exculpatory clause would avoid conflict
and thrust the implementing legislation to the top of the hierarchy of
governing law concerning agreements to arbitrate in international
reinsurance contracts.
Once it is established that the Convention and its implementing
legislation directly regulate the business of insurance, the courts
must interpret the Federal Arbitration Act, including the
implementing legislation, in a manner consistent with the obligations
set forth in the Convention. This requires courts to interpret the
rather ambiguous permissive language in Section 206 in accordance
with the affirmative obligation of the Convention to enforce arbitral
Though
agreements in international commercial transactions.
Section 206 states that courts "may" enforce arbitration agreements,
courts are bound by the Charming Betsy canon to interpret this
provision as requiring the enforcement of arbitration agreements
unless they run afoul of the affirmative defenses prescribed by the
Convention. While judicial sleight of pen transmuting permissive
language into mandatory language may seem counterintuitive, it is a
fairly standard practice. Courts regularly interpret the term "may"
as a mandatory instruction to bring legislation within constitutional
18 3
bounds or effectuate the overarching object and purpose of the act.
The final instruction of the Charming Betsy canon is that courts
may not interpret the state anti-arbitration statutes and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act to apply extraterritorially where such
application would violate principles of international law embodied in
the Convention.18 4 As mentioned earlier, this canon is most often

15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
182.
See, e.g., Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 38 (1977)
183.
("The word 'may,' when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion[,
but] [t]his common-sense principle of statutory construction . . . can be defeated by
indications of legislative intent to the contrary or by obvious inferences from the
structure and purpose of the statute."); Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189,
198-200 (Fla. 2007) (holding that "may" implies mandatory action when reading one
section of a statute in pari materia with related sections to effectuate the purpose of
the statute and maintain the constitutionality of the statute as a whole).
See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of
184.
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 489
(1997) ("It is fairly well accepted that customary international law imposes limits on
the authority of nations to regulate extraterritorially."). For an example of this
principle and its application, see Casey Reeder, Note, Zeroing in on Charming Betsy:
How an Antidumping Controversy Threatens to Sink the Schooner, 36 STETSON L. REV.
255 (2006).
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invoked to limit the potential jurisdiction of the courts in applying
U.S. federal law extraterritorially. 185 This concept might be applied
to prevent American judicial interference with a privately conducted
and agreed-upon method of resolution in an international commercial
venture. Thus, this application of the canon would require courts to
enforce the arbitration agreement according to the intent of the
private contracting parties, and not to apply conflicting federal or
state legislation extraterritorially to a contract of a truly
international nature. Proper application of the Charming Betsy
canon leads to the conclusion that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
cannot preclude the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements
which fall within the framework of the New York Convention.
C. Last-in-Time Rule
The Supreme Court has always recognized a distinction between
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, holding that only the
18 6
former are judicially enforceable absent implementing legislation.
Congress eliminated a potentially troubling analytical hurdle in this
case when it enacted legislation to implement the Convention in
1970.187
Therefore, the Convention has the status accorded to
treaties under the Constitution as the "supreme law of the land,"
subject only to any restrictions imposed by the implementing
188
legislation.
Congress has the inherent ability to override treaties by enacting
domestic laws.' 8 9 This proposition is in accord with the treatment of
federal law as compared to treaties ratified with the advice and
consent of the Senate; each is treated on par with the other.' 90 Such

185.
See supranote 177 and accompanying text.
186.
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 105, at 371; see Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
A treaty is . . . not a legislative act ....
[1]t is carried into execution by the
sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument ....
[W]hen the
terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to
perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can
become a rule for the Court.
Id.
187.
9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006); see supraPart II.C.
188.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2 ("[AIll Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .
.
189.
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 105, at 385.
190.
Id.; see Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) ("We have held that an
Act of Congress is on a full parity with a treaty .... "); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing... with an
act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the
land.").
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equality introduces the question of which body of law should apply if
a federal statute and a ratified treaty concerning the same subject are
in conflict with each other. It is well settled that, where conflict
arises, courts are bound to "construe and give effect to the latest
expression of the sovereign will." 191 Therefore, when a statute and
treaty conflict, the legal principle that is "last in date"'192 will control
193
and serve as the applicable substantive law.
This rule of decision is commonly known as the "last-in-time"
194
Most
rule and has been upheld and reaffirmed in many contexts.
commonly, the principle is invoked to support the proposition that
195
Congress has the ability to override treaties through federal law.
This congressional prerogative is not subject to doubt. However, only
once has the Supreme Court applied the last-in-time rule to hold that
a treaty can override an earlier federal statute, and despite its
apparent viability, the application of the rule in such a manner has
1 96
been exceedingly rare in the lower courts.

In the context of international reinsurance contracts, the difficult
question is whether the Convention conflicts with either the
McCarran-Ferguson Act or the state anti-arbitration statute that
provides the actual substantive rule of decision. If the controlling law
is actually state law, then there would be little doubt as to the
superiority of the Convention and its implementing legislation, and
But, if the
the last-in-time rule would not be necessary. 197

191.
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 195; see also id. at 194 ("[I1f the two are inconsistent,
the one last in date will control the other ... .
Id.
192.
193.
But see Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule
for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 326 (2005) ("Thus, despite its
acceptance by courts, the last-in-time rules suffers from near unanimous criticism in
the academy accompanied by periodic calls for its abandonment.").
See, e.g., Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
194.
100-647, § 1012(aa)(1), 102 Stat. 3343, 3531 (1988) (indicating that the last-in-time
rule must be applied to all conflicts between tax treaties and the Internal Revenue
Code); Breard, 523 U.S. at 376-77 (noting alternatively that the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, enacted in 1996, would have force over the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, ratified in 1969, due to the last-in-time rule).
195.
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 105, at 385; see, e.g., Breard, 523 U.S.
at 376 (1998) (holding that a subsequently enacted procedural rule serves to obviate
Breard's claim of relief based on violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations due to the last-in-time rule); Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 600-01
(1889).

BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 105, at 386; see Cook v. U.S., 288 U.S.
196.
102, 118-19 (1933) ('The [self-executing] Treaty, being later in date than the act of
1922, superseded, so far as inconsistent with the terms of the act, the authority which
has been conferred . . . upon officers of the Coast Guard to board, search, and seize
beyond our territorial waters.").
197.
See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (noting that
treaties generally preempt state law, and characterizing that mechanism as
"straightforward"); Ku, supra note 193, at 334, 334 n.83 (noting that the "subordination
of state law to treaties has never been seriously disputed").
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McCarran-Ferguson Act is controlling and determinative, then the
important issue is whether the Convention and the Act truly
conflict. 198 There can be no preemption of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act by the Convention under the last-in-time rule unless the "statute
cannot be enforced without antagonizing the treaty."'199 Under this
formulation, the Convention is predominant.
The enforcement of the reverse-preemption mechanism of
McCarran-Ferguson "antagoniz[es]" the Convention. The application
of the Act creates a functional conflict whereby the McCarranFerguson Act and the Convention are irreconcilable. The McCarranFerguson Act serves as a vehicle through which state substantive law
voiding arbitration agreements emerges as a federal rule of decision
when that law regulates the business of insurance. The Convention
is quite clear that arbitration agreements must be enforced unless the
agreement falls under one of the affirmative defenses provided by the
Convention. 200 Because the business of insurance does not fall within
those defenses, enforcement of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
frustrates the operation of the Convention.
In Goshawk, Georgia Code § 9-9-2 was propelled to the forefront
as law binding upon federal courts through the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Juxtaposition with the Convention reveals an incontrovertible
conflict between the two. The anti-arbitration statute-by way of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act-seeks to preclude arbitration; the
Convention seeks to facilitate it. Therefore, the last-in-time rule
would be applied to resolve the conflict between the McCarranFerguson Act (not the state statute) as the vehicle for substantive law
and the Convention. The Convention was ratified in 1970, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945, so the Convention is the expression
of congressional will "last in date" and thus should serve as the rule
of decision for courts where a conflict presents itself.
Even if the express language of Convention does not control
because it is not self-executing, the same interpretation results from
the conflict between the implementing legislation and the McCarranFerguson Act. When Section 206 is read in a mandatory manner
consistent with the Charming Betsy canon, the same conflict arises
between the mandatory instruction of the implementing legislation

The Court has minced no words in making it clear that for a treaty to
198.
preempt a federal statute, or vice-versa, there must be a clear conflict between the two
provisions. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984) (recalling that it is a "firm and obviously sound canon of construction" that both
statutory and treaty preemption do not exist absent a clear conflict). The principle is
based in the generally disfavored act of implicit repeal. See Johnson v. Browne, 205
U.S. 309, 321 (1907) ("Repeals by implication are never favored, and a later treaty will
not be regarded as repealing an earlier statute by implication unless the two are
absolutely incompatible .. " (citing U.S. v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902))).
199.
Johnson, 205 U.S. at 321.
200. Convention, supra note 21, arts. 11(1), 11(3).
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and the preemptive mechanism of the Act. 20 1
Because the
implementing legislation is the last in date of all of the documents
considered, it controls vis-A-vis the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 20 2
Thus, under the last-in-time rule and the practice of treaty
preemption, the Convention (or its implementing legislation
interpreted consistently with the Convention) should control over the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. This conclusion is consistent with the
application of pactasunt servanda and the CharmingBetsy canon.

V. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS FOR THE
PURPOSES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COMITY
AND COOPERATION

In addition to the support various canons of interpretation
provide for the enforcement of international arbitration agreements,
the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court also supports
enforcement of an agreement like that in Goshawk. Because of the
above-described difficulties with invoking international doctrines or
applying various canons of statutory interpretation, it may be easier
to rely upon the language and precedent of the Court to reach the
same conclusion.
Both federal and state court precedent support the application of,
and adherence to, functional decisional principles that reinforce
overarching commercial public policy goals in the face of contrary
state law. Milliken v. Pratt, a Massachusetts state court decision
from 1878,203 was the first to recognize the importance of facilitating
multi-state and interstate transactions. 20 4 In Milliken, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied the substantive law of Maine
to "validate a contract which would be otherwise invalid under the

201.
Various courts have found that the express language of the Convention
controls directly, and that reference to the implementing legislation is unnecessary.
See, e.g., Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mex. Nat'l Oil Co., (PEMEX), 767 F.2d
1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that "the Convention must be enforced according to
its terms over all prior inconsistent rules of law"); McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v.
CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that the Convention controls
and that it is unnecessary to look to the language of the Federal Arbitration Act). A
determination of whether the Convention is self-executing necessarily plays into this
discussion and the holdings of these courts, but it is outside of the scope of
consideration for this Note. For a discussion of the factors that may play into a court's
determination of whether a treaty is self-executing, see generally Leslie Henry, When
Is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MICH. L. REV. 776 (1928-1929); Jordan J. Paust, SelfExecuting Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); and Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Four
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995).
202.
The implementing legislation was passed on July 31, 1970. Pub. L. No. 91368, 84 Stat. 692.
203.
Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
204.
Id. at 382-83; see also HORACIo A. GRIGERA NA6N, CHOICE-OF-LAW
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 175 (1992).
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personal Massachusetts law of one of the parties. ' 205
One
commentator has concluded that this decision can be interpreted as
the functional subordination of a state rule for the purpose of
"facilitating
certainty
and
predictability
in
multi-State
20 6
transactions."
This conclusion is important because the Supreme
Court has similarly gone to great lengths to subordinate American
rules to facilitate certainty and predictability in multi-national
transactions.
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated a similar
willingness to acquiesce to general notions of commercial policy in
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 20 7 There, the Court vacated a
Fifth Circuit decision 2 8 that all forum-selection clauses were
unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 20 9 In a decision "inspired
by the need of furthering a general policy facilitating international
economic relations," 210 the Court held that despite the general
unenforceability of the forum-selection clause, lower courts should
adopt a doctrine whereby "such clauses are prima facie valid and
should be enforced unless enforcement is show by the resisting party
to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances. '211 The Court went on
to explain the basis for its decision:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and
in our courts. Absent a contract forum, the considerations relied on by
the Court of Appeals would be persuasive reasons for holding an
American forum convenient in the traditional sense, but in an era of
expanding world trade and commerce, the absolute aspects of the
doctrine of the Carbon Black case have little place and would be a
heavy hand indeed on the future development of international
commercial dealings by Americans.
We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our
2 12
terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.

The Bremen evinced a judicial predilection for rules of decision that
further international commercial comity and cooperation. Thus, the
decision helped to develop international law and comity as cognizable

205.
Id. at 175
206. Id.; cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961) (applying Nevada law
over California law to further a multi-State policy common to both California and
Nevada to protect the expectations of the parties to a multi-State transaction).
207.
407 U.S. 1 (1972); see also GRIGERA NAON, supra note 204, at 177-78.
208. Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen (In re Unterweser Reederei, Gmbh),
428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), rehearing en banc denied Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S
Bremen (In the Matter of the Complaint of Unterweser Reederei, Gmbh), 446 F.2d 907
(5th Cir. 1971).
209. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 2.
210. GRIGERA NA6N, supra note 204, at 177.
211.
The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
212.
Id. at 6.
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reasons to uphold and enforce clauses in purely international
agreements.
Milliken and The Bremen alone provide a sufficient basis on
which courts may decide that notions of commercial comity trump
domestic laws to the contrary. The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
has been much more specific in its acceptance of general principles of
international law and comity in the enforcement of international
arbitration agreements. On at least three occasions, the Court has
relied on principles of international commercial comity and
predictability to enforce an international arbitration agreement, even
though a similar agreement would have been unenforceable in the
213
domestic context.
Two years after The Bremen, the Court enforced an arbitration
'214
agreement in what it termed a "truly international agreement.
Although the lower courts had interpreted the Court's own precedent
to preclude the arbitration of conduct purportedly in violation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,215 the Court distinguished
situations where the concerned agreement was international in
nature. 216 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 217 the Court held that an
arbitration agreement in a contract between an American company
and a German citizen owning business entities incorporated in
Germany and Lichtenstein was enforceable, despite the fact that a
similar agreement in a domestic context was probably invalid on a
public policy basis. 218 The Court recognized that the enforcement of
an agreement to arbitrate was "indispensable... in international
trade, commerce, and contracting"-in much the same manner as the
enforcement of forum-selection clauses in The Bremen-due to the
necessity of eliminating uncertainties. 219 The language of the opinion
appeared to acquiesce to notions of international comity, subjugate
domestic courts to overarching commercial ideals, and recognize that
domestic law could not always properly resolve international
220
disputes.

213.
See Vimar Seguaros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M!V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
537-38 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
629 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517-19 (1974); cf. Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) ("[HIfere a national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude is involved. It can be protected only be national action in concert with that
of another power .... We are of the opinion that the treaty and statute must be upheld
[over a conflicting state statute].").
214.
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515 (1974).
215.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et
seq. (2006).
216.
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-16.
217.
Id.
218.
Id. at 515, 519-21.
219.
Id. at 518-19.
220.
See, e.g., id. at 519.
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In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
the Court again encountered seemingly intransigent precedent
inimical to the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate in
international contracts. 222 In a prior decision, the Second Circuit had
held that conflicts regarding purported violations of American
antitrust laws could not be arbitrated because "the pervasive public
interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the
claims that arise in such cases, combine to" disallow the arbitration of
rights conferred by antitrust statutes. 223 The Court went straight to
the heart of the issue, granting certiorari on the single question of
"whether an American court should enforce an agreement to resolve
when that agreement arises from an
antitrust claims by arbitration
224
international transaction."
of
The Court asserted that "any doubts concerning the scope 225
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.
Moreover, it noted that the major concern of Congress when it passed
the Federal Arbitration Act was "to enforce private agreements into

The invalidation of [an agreement to arbitrate] in the case before us would not
only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn promise but would, as well,
reflect a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws
and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets
and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved in our courts.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
To determine that American standards of fairness must nonetheless govern the
controversy demeans the standards of justice elsewhere in the world, and
unnecessarily exalts the primacy of United States law over the laws of other
countries.
Id. at 517 (internal citations omitted).
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international
arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would
invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure
tactical litigation advantages. . . . Whatever recognition the courts of this
country might ultimately have granted to the order of the foreign court, the
dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-land would surely damage the fabric
of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of
businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements.
Id. at 516-17 (footnote omitted).
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
221.
222.
See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 623 ("[T]he Court of Appeals concluded
that neither this Court's decision in Scherk nor the Convention required abandonment
of that doctrine in the face of an international transaction.").
American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d
223.
Cir. 1968).
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 624 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
224.
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 469 U.S. 916 (1984) (granting writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit)).
Id. at 626.
225.
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which parties had entered, a concern which requires that [the Court]
rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate. '226 The Court again
distinguished the instant case as one that concerned international
commerce, and refused to follow the doctrine of non-arbitrability in
antitrust conflicts relied upon by the Court of Appeals, because it
applied uniquely to domestic transactions. 227 Writing for the Court,
Justice Blackmun concluded, similarly to the Northern District of
Georgia in Goshawk, that concerns of an international nature played
a major role in the decision:
[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign
and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of
disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming
228
that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.

Specifically citing The Bremen 229 and Scherk, 2 30 the Court reaffirmed
the "strong presumption in favor of enforcement of freely negotiated"
23 1
contractual provisions.
Conspicuously missing from the Court's opinion in Mitsubishi
Motors, however, is a strict reliance on the terms of the Convention.
Though the Court offers the Convention as further evidence of a
federal policy in favor of the enforcement of arbitration agreements,
particularly "in the field of international commerce," it invokes
neither the articles of the Convention nor the implementing
legislation as federal law to be enforced in domestic courts. 23 2 While
the outcome generally encourages proponents of international
arbitration, the analysis must be discouraging to those who extol the
provisions of the Convention and its implementing legislation as
binding, supreme law.
Mitsubishi Motors stands as a strong indication of Supreme
Court sentiment regarding international commercial arbitration
because of the nature of the domestic policy concern overridden in
that case. Soler, the plaintiff to the original action that resulted in
Mitsubishi Motors, claimed that the arbitration agreement violated
certain antitrust rights conferred by the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court has described the Sherman Act as "the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. '233 It has analogized the protections of economic freedom

226.
Id. at 625-26 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 479 U.S. 213, 221
(1985)).
227.
Id. at 629.
228.
Id.
229.
Id. at 630.
230.
Id.
231.
Id. at 630-31.
232.
Id. at 631.
233.
U.S. v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); see Jill A. Pietrowski,
Comment, Enforcing InternationalCommercial ArbitrationAgreements Post Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AM. U. L. REV. 57, 77 (1986).
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provided by the Sherman Act to those protections of fundamental
personal freedoms provided by the Bill of Rights. 234 The antitrust
principles and rights prescribed by the Sherman Act are undoubtedly
some of the most important in the hierarchy of U.S. domestic
235
policy.
If the Court sees fit to supersede such staid standards with
policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements, then the
standards and policies behind legislation granting the states the
privilege of regulating the business of insurance can be overcome by
similar reasoning. So far, the Supreme Court has not ruled on a
single situation in which domestic policy would give rise to sufficient
concern to require the voiding of an agreement to arbitrate a truly
Such strong judicial endorsement of
international contract. 236
contract policy should be followed in and of its own accord.
These cases illustrate that international agreements to arbitrate
are enforceable despite public policy concerns that might warrant a
contrary decision if the agreement were purely domestic. 237 This
conclusion offers great prospective benefit to courts faced with
conflicting precedent with regard to public policy concerns and
arbitration agreements. Those courts may undertake an analysis of
the persuasive Supreme Court precedent in favor of the enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate, notwithstanding any proposed domestic
The subsequent outcome, preferably enforcing the
obstacles.
agreement to arbitrate, will be based not only upon general ideals of
international comity and international commercial policy, but also on
the specific recognition by the Supreme Court of the importance of
equilibrium and consistency within the international commercial
realm.

VI. CONCLUSION

A national policy favoring the arbitration of international
commercial agreements will become increasingly important in the
coming years. The President and the Senate of the United States

234.
Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. at 610; see Pietrowski, supra note 233, at 77.
235.
See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 634 (1985) (noting the "fundamental
importance to American democratic capitalism of the regime of antitrust laws").
But see id. at 637 n.19 ("We merely note that in the event the choice-of236.
forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's
right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little
hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.").
237.
See Pietrowski, supra note 234, at 59-60 ("United States courts have
frequently determined ... that domestic public policy exceptions are inapplicable when
the parties' claims are based on an international contract. Courts reason that the
arbitration of international claims raises vital concerns of international comity that
purely domestic cases do not.").
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recognized this trend thirty-eight years ago, and such foresight
should not be curtailed. Many federal courts have recognized that the
enforcement of international arbitration agreements follows
necessarily from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and that pattern
238
should not change.
Under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda,239 the Charming
Betsy canon, 240 and the last-in-time rule, 241 the Convention and its
implementing legislation should be enforceable over a state antiarbitration statute empowered as reverse-preemptive by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Moreover, proper construction of both the
Convention and implementing legislation leads to the conclusion that
valid international arbitration agreements falling under the
Convention should be enforced. However, even if none of those
canons are applied, the purpose underlying the Convention still
applies to purely international disputes. This is true even in the face
of considerable and significant domestic policy concerns such as
antitrust rights. The Supreme Court has held that international
comity and policy dictate that private international arbitration
agreements must be enforced in order to secure the international
commercial order and to encourage international discourse and trade.
This analysis may be unique, but its outcome is not. It has not
been rare for lower courts to enforce international arbitration
agreements under the Convention notwithstanding an antiarbitration statute falling under the auspices of the McCarranFerguson Act. 242 In Goshawk, the Northern District of Georgia

238.
See infra note 242.
239.
See supra Part IV.A.
240.
See supra Part IV.B.
241.
See supra Part 1V.C.
242.
See, e.g., Antillean Marine Shipping Corp. v. Through Transp. Mut. Ins.,
Ltd., No. 02-22196-Civ., 2002 WL 32075793 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2002); Jantran, Inc. v.
Sphere Drake Ins., P.L.C., No. Civ.A.2:96CV085-D-B, 1997 WL 88259 (N.D. Miss. Feb.
18, 1997); Continental Ins. Co. v. Jantran, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1995);
McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, Civ. A. No. 91-841, 1992
WL 37695 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 1992); see also Assuranceforeningen Skuld (Gjensidig) v.
Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc., 847 So. 2d 991 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003). However, in the
domestic context, the results of the lower courts are more varied in deciding whether
the McCarran-Ferguson Act enables state anti-arbitration statutes to reverse preempt
federal law in the insurance context. Compare Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not preclude the application of the Federal Arbitration Act because the state
arbitration statute was not one regulating the business of insurance, but a method of
handling contract disputes generally), Triton Lines, Inc. v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting
Assoc., 707 F. Supp. 277 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempted a state anti-arbitration provision in the insurance code because a disputed
claim, and its subsequent resolution, is not the business of insurance), and Bernstein v.
Centaur Ins. Co., 606 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the Federal Arbitration
Act preempted a state policy against arbitrating insurance claims because the state did
not have a statute that specifically prohibited arbitration in the insurance industry),
with McKnight v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding
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followed the path trodden by previous pioneers to conclude that the
international instrument controls in a conflict between a Convention
vital to the successes of international commerce and a federal statute
committed to retaining the long-preserved sovereignty of the Several
States in an area of regulation that is unmistakably committed to
them. The conclusion was the correct one, and future courts faced
with the same conflict should take heed of Goshawk and Mitsubishi
Motors in the enforcement of international arbitration agreements
under the Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.
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